

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

VIKTOR BOUT,

a/k/a "Boris,"

a/k/a "Victor Anatoliyevich Bout,"

a/k/a "Victor But,"

a/k/a "Viktor Budd,"

a/k/a "Viktor Butt,"

a/k/a "Viktor Bulakin,"

a/k/a "Vadim Markovich Aminov,"

Defendant.

CASE NO. 08 Cr. 365

REBUTTAL AFFIDAVIT  
CONCERNING  
REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION

REBUTTAL AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING  
REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION

LOUIS J. MILIONE, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am a citizen and a resident of the United States. Since 1997, I have been a Special Agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). Since 2007, I have served as the Group Supervisor of the DEA's Narco-Terrorism Group. In that capacity, I have participated in and supervised the DEA's investigation of VIKTOR BOUT (hereafter "BOUT") in the case of United States v. VIKTOR BOUT, a/k/a "Boris," a/k/a "Victor Anatoliyevich Bout," a/k/a "Victor But," a/k/a "Viktor Budd," a/k/a "Viktor Butt," a/k/a "Viktor Bulakin," a/k/a "Vadim Markovich Aminov", Criminal Docket Number 08 Cr. 365 (the "Indictment"), and am familiar with the facts of the investigation.

2. I submit this Rebuttal Affidavit to refute a number of assertions that BOUT and his lawyers have made during the extradition proceedings. The information contained within this affidavit demonstrates that Bout's claim that he did not travel to Thailand on March 6, 2008, to sell weapons for use by the FARC to kill Americans is meritless.

#### Background

3. The following describes certain identities used in this affidavit:

"CC-1": Co-Conspirator of Viktor Bout

"CS-1": Confidential Source working with DEA (1 of 3)

"CS-2": Confidential Source working with DEA (2 of 3)

"CS-3": Confidential Source working with DEA (3 of 3)

4. Paragraphs 14 through 19 of the Affidavit of Christine A. Hanley, dated May 1, 2008 (the "Hanley Affidavit"), describe the meetings that CC-1 had with CS-1, CS-2, and CS-3 in Romania between January 26 and February 7, 2008. Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Hanley Affidavit describe the communications BOUT had with CS-2 about a March 6, 2008 meeting in Bangkok, Thailand. In addition, Paragraphs 23 through 32 describe the March 6, 2008 meeting in Bangkok, Thailand involving BOUT, CC-1, CS-2, and CS-3. This meeting lasted for approximately two hours and was recorded. This Rebuttal Affidavit provides further details concerning the communications BOUT had with CS-2 prior to the

March 6, 2008 meeting, as well as further details about the events of the meeting.

#### Communications from Bout about the Bangkok Meeting

5. On February 7, 2008, during a recorded meeting in Romania, CS-2 provided CC-1 with an email address (the "CS-2 Email Address") for BOUT and CC-1 to use to contact CS-2 in the future. On February 12, 2008, CS-2 received an email at the CS-2 Email Address from BOUT indicating that CS-2 could use that email address to communicate with BOUT. Records obtained from the provider of BOUT's email address indicate that the account was created on February 12, 2008 under the name "Victor But," with an address in Moscow, Russia. A copy of the email sent by BOUT is attached as Exhibit 1 to this affidavit.

6. Between February 21 and February 25, 2008, BOUT spoke with CS-2 over the telephone approximately three times. During these telephone calls, which were recorded, BOUT indicated that he planned to travel to Bangkok, Thailand on March 6, 2008 to meet with CS-2 and CS-3 to discuss the arms deal. The original recordings of these telephone calls are stored in a secure evidence facility maintained by the DEA in the United States.

#### Bout's Statements at the Bangkok Meeting

7. On March 6, 2008, BOUT, CC-1, and an unnamed associate of BOUT's met with CS-2 and CS-3 at a hotel in Bangkok, Thailand

for approximately two hours to discuss the details of the arms deal. During this meeting, which was recorded, the following conversations, among others, about the weapons deal occurred, primarily in Spanish. I have personally reviewed an English translation of a transcript of this meeting, which has been prepared at the direction of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York by a certified interpreter.<sup>1</sup> I have also participated in the interviews of CS-2 and CS-3 concerning the events of the meeting. Based on the foregoing, among other things, I have learned the following regarding the March 6, 2008 meeting in Bangkok:

a. BOUT made statements reflecting his clear understanding that CS-2 and CS-3 - with whom he was negotiating the sale of millions of dollars of weapons - were representatives of the FARC. For example, at the beginning of the meeting, BOUT stated that he was "very sorry" to learn "what happened two days ago." Based on my experience with the DEA, including prior cases involving the FARC, I understand BOUT to have been referring to the death of Raul Reyes, a very high-level FARC member, who had been killed in early March 2008, and whose death had been widely publicized in the international media at the time. BOUT also acknowledged having heard of the recent death of "Negro Acacio,"

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<sup>1</sup> The original recording of this meeting is stored in a secure evidence facility maintained by the DEA in the United States.

another very high-level FARC member who had been killed months before Reyes.

b. Over the course of the almost-two hour meeting, BOUT offered to supply the FARC with an arsenal of military-grade weaponry and vehicles, including:

(i) 700 to 800 surface-to-air missiles, which the FARC would use to defend against Apache and Blackhawk helicopters;

(ii) 5,000 AK-47 firearms;

(iii) millions of rounds of ammunition;

(iv) various Russian spare parts for rifles;

(v) anti-personnel land mines and C-4 explosives;

(vi) night-vision equipment;

(vii) "ultralight" airplanes, which could be outfitted with grenade launchers and missiles; and

(viii) unmanned aerial vehicles, which have a range of 200 to 300 kilometers.

c. BOUT offered to arrange an airdrop of these weapons through "parachute cargo systems," and also offered to sell two planes -- an "Antonov" and an "Ilyushin" -- that the FARC could use for weapons deliveries. BOUT even brought pamphlets for both planes to the meeting. These pamphlets were seized from BOUT at the time of his arrest and copies of the pamphlets are attached as Exhibit 2.

d. The recorded meeting on March 6, 2008 also makes clear that BOUT understood and supported the FARC's intentions to use the arms that he was selling to target United States nationals. For example, CS-2 stated to BOUT, "[W]hat happens is that the American Air Force doesn't have . . . Well, what they use the most are the Chinooks and the Apaches" and "we don't have anything right now with which to defend ourselves." In response, BOUT inquired about identifying American flights to target, asking, "Do you have, have your people near the military bases? Do you have . . . all the data of when they go . . . out?" Shortly thereafter, CS-2 stated that the FARC would need sights for snipers "to start to blow the heads off . . . . Because the Americans have personnel training them." BOUT even offered to provide training for the snipers, stating, "that's why, that's why because we want to send the people to train an army . . . . We can, uh, teach."

e. During the meeting, CS-2 stated, "You see the troops. You see the helicopters landing and the Colombian troops getting off, but the pilot is American. And we want to start . . . start killing American pilots." Again embracing the FARC's objective to kill American Air Force pilots, BOUT replied, "Yes, yes. We're, we're going to prepare everything." In addition, referring to the United States, BOUT stated "We're together . . . . And we have the same enemy." Later in the meeting, BOUT made

clear that he, too, had a personal stake in this arms deal with the FARC, stating, "It's not, uh, business. It's my fight."

f. Apart from offering weapons and training, BOUT also suggested he could assist the FARC in laundering money. When CS-2 stated that the FARC had approximately 40 million Euros in Romania, Greece, and Spain that they needed to move, BOUT stated, "We can find you the way to, to, to do it properly." BOUT cautioned: "If you work in the dollars, everything goes to U.S. U.S. monitoring it. And even, you know last time I send a payment - small, ten thousand. I just mentioned . . . They blocked . . . They have computer program which everything in the OFAC list. You know OFAC." I believe that this is a reference to the United States Office of Foreign Assets and Control (commonly known as "OFAC"), which in 2004 placed BOUT on the Specially Designated Nationals ("SDN") list.<sup>2</sup> BOUT also suggested "work[ing] through . . . Russia, Venezuela, and Belarus," and advised that the FARC should "purchase a bank" through which it could direct where to send money. BOUT further claimed to have "friends who are, uh, working with banks" who notified him 24 hours in advance of any blocks or holds that were about to be placed on accounts.

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<sup>2</sup> OFAC generally imposes economic sanctions against parties conducting business with any individual or entity placed on the SDN list.

### Incriminating Items Bout Brought to the Bangkok Meeting

8. BOUT brought several incriminating items to his meeting with CS-2 and CS-3, which were seized at the time of his arrest, and which are described below. Although the original items of evidence are stored in a secure evidence facility maintained by the DEA in the United States, I have attached copies of these items to my affidavit.

(a) A series of articles, or print-outs, about the FARC. A copy of one of the articles, which states at the top, "Colombia, FARC, narcoterrorism, and the drug war," is attached as Exhibit 3. This article states that the FARC "finances its operations through kidnaping and ransom, extortion, and narcotics trafficking. It also targets anyone suspected of conspiring with the military or paramilitaries." The article also describes acts of violence that the FARC has engaged in since 2001, including the kidnapping and murder of government officials and the highjacking of a Colombian airplane. The article further describes that the FARC's "conventional guerilla weapons include explosives, landmines and bombs camouflaged as necklaces, soccer balls, and soup cans." Finally, the article also indicates that "the FARC earns between \$250 and \$300 million through criminal acts, of which 65 percent comes from the drug trade."

(b) A map of South America on which BOUT asked CS-2 and CS-3 to identify American radar stations. A copy of the cover



and back of the map is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.

(c) As noted in paragraph 7(c) above, two brochures for cargo airplanes that BOUT suggested the FARC could buy to transport weapons. Copies of the covers of the brochures are attached as Exhibit 2.

(d) A set of notes handwritten by BOUT during the meeting regarding the details of the weapons deal. A copy of the handwritten notes is attached as Exhibit 5.

(i) BOUT's handwritten notes include references in English to "AA = 100+700," which I believe is a reference to BOUT's offer to sell anti-aircraft missiles to the FARC. As set forth above, during the meeting in Bangkok, BOUT stated to CS-3 that he could provide "seven hundred, eight hundred missiles," to which CS-3 replied, "OK. We'll start with a hundred. For the first shipment." BOUT's handwritten notes referring to the sale of anti-aircraft missiles are also entirely consistent with what BOUT's co-conspirator, CC-1, had told CS-1 and CS-2 in a recorded meeting in Romania. As set forth in the Hanley Affidavit, on or about January 28, 2008, during a recorded meeting with CS-1 and CS-2, CC-1 provided CS-2 with a digital memory stick that contained, among other things, documents containing photographs and specifications for anti-aircraft missiles and armor-piercing rocket launchers that BOUT could provide. A copy of these documents and photographs contained in the memory stick that CC-1

provided is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.

(ii) BOUT's handwritten notes also include a reference to "AK-47," which I believe is a reference to BOUT's offer to sell the FARC AK-47 firearms.


(iii) BOUT's handwritten notes also include a reference to "RPG-7" and "RPG-22," which I believe is a reference to BOUT's offer to sell to the FARC rocket propelled grenades.

(iv) BOUT's handwritten notes also include a reference to "UAV," which I believe is a reference to BOUT's offer to sell the FARC "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles." During the meeting, BOUT claimed that UAVs have "a range of two hundred, three hundred kilometers."


(v) BOUT's handwritten notes also include a reference to "AN-32" and "IL-76," which I believe is a reference to the types of planes that BOUT was offering to sell to the FARC for delivering weapons. During the meeting, BOUT specifically referred to the "Antonov-32" and the "Illyushin-76," which could be used to air-drop weapons in South America for the FARC.

9. Based upon the foregoing, as well as the Hanley Affidavit, the United States of America respectfully requests that VIKTOR BOUT be extradited to the United States of America, Southern District of New York, for prosecution of the above offenses.

Dated: February 17, 2009  
New York, New York  
United States of America

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
LOUIS J. MILIONE  
Special Agent  
Drug Enforcement Administration

I hereby certify that this is the original affidavit sworn to and subscribed to before me, in English, by LOUIS J. MILIONE on February 17, 2009, in New York, New York, United States of America.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

**Debra Freeman**  
**United States Magistrate Judge**  
**Southern District of New York**

## Exhibit 1

**From:** Agregatum Mobile <agregatum@gmail.com>

**To:** Amigo <bogotazo32@yahoo.com>

**Sent:** Tuesday, February 12, 2008 7:00:31 AM

**Subject:**

**Buenos Dias!**

**This is e mail we can use for communication**

**Best regards**


**Friend of Andrew**

## Exhibit 2

Виктор Марковский

# ИЛ-76

## НА СЛУЖБЕ В ВВС



Николай ЯКУБОВИЧ

# Ил-18

## САМОЛЕТЫ

### СОБОВОГО НАЗНАЧЕНИЯ



ЦЕИХГАУЗ



## Exhibit 3

Source: *Online NewsHour*  
2003

## **Colombia's Civil War Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)**



The FARC, with some 17,500 members, is active throughout Colombia and headquartered in the south of the country, where it largely governed a region about the size of Switzerland for over 40 years. Its primary mission is to overthrow the state and establish a communist-agrarian state.

The FARC is governed by a seven-member secretariat, chaired by its 71-year old original founder, Manuel Marulanda. Some 30 percent of the FARC is female and most are younger than 19.

The FARC finances its operations through kidnapping and ransom, extortion, and narcotics trafficking. It also targets anyone suspected of conspiring with the military and paramilitaries.

According to military analysts, the FARC earns between \$250 and \$300 million through criminal acts, of which 65 percent comes from the drug trade.

The FARC's conventional "guerrilla" weapons include explosives,

landmines and bombs camouflaged as necklaces, soccer balls, and soup cans.

They have also orchestrated prison revolts, attacked against police and military personnel and regularly set up roadblocks to "protect" villages from military or paramilitary infiltration. According to reports, the FARC forcibly enlists any persons between the ages of 13 and 60 to work coca or poppy plantations, and serve in the military. The FARC have also targeted religious leaders and banned any spiritual expression.

The FARC has its roots in Colombia's La Violencia, the country's ten-year civil war, beginning in the late 1940s.

During a hard-line military dictatorship, dissident members of the Liberal and Communist parties left mainstream politics to establish their own communist and agrarian "independent republics." The largest cooperative, which had 1,000 members, was located in Marquetalia, a rural municipality high in the Andean plains. According to FARC lore, it was led by an 18-year old peasant named Manuel Marulanda.

After the civil war, in the late 1950s, the Colombian government struggled to reassert its control over the state and cracked down on all subversive groups, including the communist republics in southern and central Colombia.

In 1964, the Colombian military, using a loan from the US, launched a napalm attack against the independent republic of Marquetalia. The attack prompted the survivors to declare war against Colombia and founded the Southern Bloc.

Two years later, at an annual conference of guerrilla leaders, the Southern Bloc expanded their military agenda into a nation-wide "Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia," with revolutionary left-wing "focos" throughout

Colombia. Marulanda remained the commander-in-chief of the militia.

Marulanda's lifelong friend and second-in-command, Jacobo Arenas, considered the FARC's political founder, envisioned an agrarian and communist state with small-sized industries. Arenas integrated a political mission with the FARC's military strategy to overthrow a government it perceived as elitist and corrupt.

Unlike the ELN, the FARC was not directly inspired by the Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro or the Soviet Union. The FARC's ideology, instead, contained highly nationalist and anti-capitalist rhetoric rooted in early progressive ideology.

While Arenas approved of using criminal means to finance its revolutionary end, he did not wholly endorse the FARC's cultivation and trafficking of narcotics.

The FARC maintains its revolutionary operation by collecting "war taxes" from residents, businesses, and landowners in the regions they control.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the FARC established its own schools, judicial system, health care, and agrarian economy, and created its own de facto state in remote regions of southern Colombia.

During this time, the FARC expanded to 27 battallions throughout the country -- the largest left-wing group in South America. It, however, remained strongest in Colombia's rural areas and became known for improving health care, schools, and infrastructure in these remote locations.

With the increasing public support for the FARC and leftist politics, former president Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) initiated cease-fire negotiations with the FARC. In May 1984, the government and the FARC signed La Uribe peace accords

under which the FARC was permitted to form a legitimate political party, the Uniyn Patriytica. The UP party -- comprised of disarmed guerrillas, former Communists, and Gaitanist Liberals -- espoused anti-corruption policies, harsh penalties against narco-traffickers and progressive land and economic reforms.

As the UP won more municipal and national elections, it became a major target of right-wing death squads and paramilitaries, which had become more systematic in their elimination of guerrillas and suspected leftist sympathizers.

Pablo Escobar's "MAS," and Fidel Castaco's powerful paramilitary called the ACCU orchestrated assaults against the UP and any communist sympathizers.

At least 3,000 UP members, including presidential candidates, mayors and legislators, have been murdered or have disappeared since 1984. The assassination of a leading UP presidential candidate renewed FARC violence as many UP party members came to view military tactics as their only path to achieve political influence.

With the diminished hope of legitimate political participation, the FARC, having seized control of coca and poppy fields throughout the country, began to collect "coca taxes" from farmers, residents and workers of narcotics plantations. This dramatically increased their revenue.

When Arenas died in 1990, the FARC expanded its involvement in the illicit drug industry. The FARC's leadership reinterpreted Arenas' ideology to include the legalization of narcotics, arguing that Colombia could profit from the US expensive addiction.

By the mid-1990s, the FARC derived 65 percent of its income from narco-trafficking. With this massive revenue source, the FARC modernized its weapons and

launched a military and political campaign called "the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia."

The FARC purchased contraband arms, expanded its military ranks, and initiated a public relations campaign within the cities and universities.

From 1996 to 1998, the FARC struck fear in the Colombian government with a series of major military victories over the national army. Most notably, the FARC overtook a military base in Las Delicias, taking dozens of Colombian troops as hostage.

With growing concerns about the FARC's military capability, Colombians held demonstrations and protests to urge the government to reinstitute peace talks with the FARC during the late 1990s.

As an incentive to bring the FARC to commit to a cease-fire, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana offered the guerilla group a demilitarized zone around its historic stronghold in southern Colombia -- an area comprising 42,000 sq km populated with nearly 120,000 residents.

Even with the official demilitarized zone (DMZ), the peace talks largely remained unproductive during its three years. The biggest result of the three-year peace talks occurred when the FARC released several hundred of its hostages, some of whom had been held for years.

The FARC's frequently terminated peace negotiations, claiming the Colombian military and paramilitaries were infiltrating their zone. The FARC demanded that the government recognize it as a legitimate political group, release imprisoned members and implement economic and land reforms.

While the public grew increasingly impatient with the fruitless peace talks, guerrilla fighters executed a series of shocking and brutal attacks.

In mid-2001, the FARC's violent acts included the kidnapping and murder of Consuelo Araújooguera, a popular former minister of culture, and the wife of Attorney-General Edgardo Maya. Guerillas also kidnapped former governor Alan Jara, who was riding in a United Nations vehicle, and three German aid workers.

In 2002, the FARC hijacked a Colombian airliner and took passenger Sen. Jorge Gechem Turbay as its hostage, the fifth congressman the FARC had kidnapped since June 2001.

The FARC announced its new policy, the "Law 002," which mandated that anyone with assets of \$1 million pay "war taxes" or else they would be kidnapped.

On Feb. 23, 2002, with the peace process in total shambles, the FARC kidnapped presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who wrote extensively in support of peace talks and about government corruption.

The FARC resumed its war against the Colombian government, swearing to disrupt the economy and launch a murder spree against government supporters. Pastrana responded with a massive military incursion into the FARC's former autonomous region, the first within nearly ten years.

-- By Liz Harper, Online NewsHour

*see also*

2007

Cocaine, Inc

Pablo Escobar

George W. Bush

Bolivian cocaine

Mexican cocaine

The Coke-father

Canine corruption

Cocaine resources

Colombian cocaine

Venezuelan cocaine

The Colombian navy

Benjamin Arellano Felix

Colombian cocaine substitution

Colombia and the US cocaine market

[English suburbia and Colombian cocaine](#)  
[The Orejuela brothers and the Cali cocaine cartel](#)

[Refs](#)  
[Home](#)  
[HedWeb](#)  
[Cocaine, Inc](#)  
[Future Opioids](#)  
[BLTC Research](#)  
[Wirehead Hedonism](#)  
[Utopian Pharmacology](#)  
[Mexican Cocaine Cartels](#)  
[The Hedonistic Imperative](#)  
[When Is It Best To Take Crack Cocaine?](#)  
[Colombia, Narcoterrorism and the AngloAmerican Drug War](#)



The Responsible Parent's Guide To  
Healthy Mood Boosters For All The Family



## Exhibit 4



**INSIGHT TRAVEL MAP**

# **SOUTH AMERICA**


## **NORTHERN REGION**

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**Bolivia • Colombia • Ecuador**  
**Peru • Venezuela**

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**1 : 4 Million**



**distance indicators**  
**comprehensive index**  
**digital cartography**




# INSIGHT TRAVEL MAP

## SOUTH AMERICA NORTHERN REGION

Bolivia • Colombia • Ecuador  
Peru • Venezuela

1 : 4 Million  
1 cm = 40 km / 1 inch = 63 miles



£5.99

ISBN 981-4120-63-4



## Exhibit 5

$$1. AA = 100 + 700 - 800$$

$$2. AK-47 - 10 - 20 \mu$$

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$$5. 34H -$$

$$6. 7,62 \times 54 = 10.000.000$$

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
$$60 \mu\text{m} - 500$$

$$82 \mu\text{m} - 200$$

$$120 \mu\text{m} = 20$$

$$(C) \rightarrow \text{ПЛАСТИК} - 5$$

$$\begin{matrix} RPG-7 \\ RPG-22 \end{matrix} \quad \begin{matrix} AG-17 \\ \Phi 0 \end{matrix}$$



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
$$\underline{\underline{1176 = 11 \underline{70}}}$$

$$\underline{\underline{1176 - 90}}$$

## Exhibit 6



## 9K111 Fagot and 9K111-2 Fagot-M antitank weapon systems



A 9M111M Fagot-M ATGM being fired from the BMD-1P airborne ICV.

The **9K111 Fagot** and **9K111-2 Fagot-M** man-portable battalion-level ATGM systems appeared in the 1970s as the first Russian tube-launched ATGM weapon systems and were designed by the KBP (Instrument-Making Design Bureau) based in Tula as a replacement for the older Malyutka ATGM systems in the AT platoons of the BTR-equipped motorized rifle battalions as well as for those mounted on the BMP-1 and BMD-1 infantry combat vehicles (the modified vehicles were designated BMP-1P and BMD-1P).

The ATGM platoons of the mechanized infantry battalions and airborne infantry brigades have 6 three-man firing teams armed with these ATGM systems. The operator carries the folded **9P135** firing post as a backpack, and each of the assistant operators carries two missiles in containers as a backpack. Unlike the ATGM teams equipped with the older Malyutka ATGM systems, these teams do not carry a RPG-7 shoulder-fired AT rocket launcher because the Fagot does not have the 500 m. deadspace of the Malyutka. The Fagot ATGM systems are to be replaced by the **Metis** ATGM systems.

The Fagot ATGMs can also be fired from the BMP-2, BMD-2 and BMD-3 infantry combat vehicles and from the 9P148 BRDM-2 tank destroyers.




A 9K111 Fagot ATGM system manned by a three-man crew in action.  
Notice the earlier 9S451 guidance system with the 9Sh119M sight.

9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot A)

The 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot A) uses the tube-launched 9M111 SACLOS, wire-guided ATGM. The 9M111 missile is stored and carried in a container, which also serves as a launch tube. It has a minimum range of 70 m. and a maximum of 2000 m. and it has a unitary HEAT warhead which can penetrate 400 mm. of steel armor. The missile can engage moving targets efficiently only if their speed is below 60 km./h. and its use is allowed in heights up to 3000 m. above the sea level. When the missile is fired, the gas generator blows it forward out of the tube with a speed of 80 m./s. and, after it has traveled a safe distance from the firing post, the fuze is activated and the missile's own sustained motor powers it on the flight to the target for 11 seconds with a flight speed of 186 m./s. The wire for the missile guidance is located in the container's blow-out lid which opens on the lower left side when the missile is fired.

Technical characteristics for the 9K111 Fagot ATGM system:


System:	Designations:	Russian Army	9K111
		U.S. Army	AT-4a
		NATO	Spigot A
	Guidance:	SACLOS	
	Weight:	35 kg.	
	Rate of fire:	3 rds./min.	
	Service entry:	1973	
Missile:	Designation:	9M111	
	Dimensions:	Length:	863 mm.
		Diameter:	120 mm.
		Wing span:	369 mm.
	Weight:	Missile only:	11,5 kg.
		Missile in container:	13 kg.
	Warhead:	Type:	HEAT
		Weight:	2,5 kg.
	Range:	Minimum:	70 m.
		Maximum:	2000 m.
	Speed:	at launch:	80 m./s.
		flight speed:	186 m./s.
	Penetration:	400 mm. of armor	
	Propellant:	solid fuel	
	Maximum flight time:		11 s.
	First-round hit probability:		90%+
Firing Post:	Designation:	9P135	
	Weight:	22 kg.	



The 9K111-2 Fagot-M ATGM system.  
Notice the later 9S451M guidance unit with the 9Sh119M1 sight.

### 9K111-2 Fagot-M (AT-4 Spigot B)

The 9K111-2 Fagot-M (AT-4 Spigot B) uses the 9M111M ATGM with an improved sustained motor which increases the maximum range to 2500 m. and an improved warhead which can penetrate 460 mm. of steel armor. The 9K111-2 ATGM system uses the same 9P135 firing post as the older 9K111 system.




The 9M111M Fagot-M ATGM and its container/launch tube.

Technical characteristics for the 9K111-2 Fagot-M ATGM system:

System:	Designations:	Russian Army	9K111-2
		U.S. Army	AT-4b
		NATO	Spigot B
	Guidance:	SACLOS	
	Weight:	35 kg.	
	Rate of fire:	3 rds./min.	
	Service entry:	1975	


Missile:	Designation:	9M111M	
	Dimensions:	Length:	910 mm.
		Diameter:	120 mm.
		Wing span:	369 mm.
		Container length:	1098 mm.
	Weight:	Missile only:	11,5 kg.
		Missile in container:	13 kg.
	Warhead:	Type:	HEAT
		Weight:	2,5 kg.
	Range:	Minimum:	75 m.
		Maximum:	2500 m.
	Speed:	at launch:	80 m./s.
		flight speed:	186 m./s.
	Penetration:	460 mm. of armor	
	Propellant:	solid fuel	
Firing Post:	Maximum flight time:		13,5 s.
	First-round hit probability:		90%+
	Designation:	9P135	
	Weight:	22 kg.	



The 9P135 firing post.


### The 9P135 firing post

The 9P135 firing post for ground-launched employment is consisted of a tripod-mounted 9P56 launcher with the 9S451M guidance unit and the firing mechanism attached to it.



The 9P56 launcher.


The 9P56 launcher is designed to hold the guidance unit and the missile container. The missile container is loaded on the 9P56 launcher by sliding it on the support rail from the rear until the mechanical catch and the electrical contacts engage. The 9S451M guidance unit is mechanically attached to the rail of the launch tube and moves together with it. A locking lever allows it to be released and rotated into the folded position for transport.



### The 9S451M guidance unit.


The 9S451M guidance unit is comprised from the 9Sh119M1 monocular periscopic sight and the 9S474 missile tracker unit. The missile tracker unit measures the deviation between the missile and the operator's line-of-sight by an IR tracking apparatus that tracks the IR source located in the tail of the missile and then generates guidance commands which are then transmitted to the missile's guidance unit by a wire, causing it to eliminate the deviation. The tracking unit is very simple and inexpensive and it has an extremely narrow field of view which makes it very difficult to decoy, since the decoy source has to be in inside its field of view.

The 9Sh119M1 monocular optical sight has a x10 magnification and a field of view of 5° and is used together with the 9S469 or 9S469M indicator of IR interferences, which is carried by the gunner. When there is an IR interference in the sight's field of view, an electrical diode reflects a red blinking light in the dark section of the sight just below the crosshairs. The sight has two optical channels with a constant or variable diaphragm. The field of view for channel No.1 with the variable diaphragm is 2,5° and it is marked with the big circle in the crosshairs of the sight. Channel No.2 with the constant diaphragm has a field of view of 30' which is marked by the middle circle, or 6' with the variable diaphragm marked by the small circle. The small circle is used to set the line-of-sight of the firing post before launching the missile and it can also be used to guide it if the target is less then 500 m. away.




A view of the sighting reticle.

The 9S451 guidance units, which were produced before 1979, had optical sights with a small circle's field of view (that is, of the optical channel No.2 with the variable diaphragm) of 10'.



The firing mechanism.

The firing mechanism is attached on the left side of the 9S474 missile tracker. When the operator pulls the trigger, the inductor generates electrical impulses which activate the electrical charges of the launch tube's second battery, the missile's battery and the gyroscopic coordinator's rotor in the guidance unit of the missile.



A section of the 9M111M Fagot-M ATGM and its container.

Thanks to the SACLOS guidance, the 9K111 Fagot and 9K111-2 Fagot-M ATGM systems have an increased accuracy and reduced training requirements for their operators over the previous 9K11 Malyutka system with MCLOS guidance because the operator no longer needs to track the target and the missile at the same time, but to keep the sight fixed on the target.

Technical characteristics for the 9P135 firing post:

Weight with the backpack and tools:		22,5 kg.
Weight with the transport case:		45 kg.
Dimensions:	Length:	1.098 mm. (with the launch tube)
	Width:	770 mm.
	Height:	707 mm.
Target tracking speed:	in traverse:	1,5°/s.(1st speed) or 0,5°/s.(2nd speed)
	in elevation:	1,5°/s.
Launcher traverse:		360°
Launcher elevation:		from -20° to +20°
Temperature range:		from -50°C to +50°C
Sight's magnification:		x10
Sight's field of view:		5°
Field of view of the optical channel No.1:		6° with the constant diaphragm,



	2,5° with the variable diphragm
Field of view of the optical channel No.2:	30' with the constant diphragm, 6' (10") with the variable diphragm

### The TRAKT (1PN65) and MULAT (1PN86) thermal sights

The NPO GIPO (Research and Production Association-State Institute of Applied Optics), one of Russia's leading enterprises for designing optronic systems for the Russian armed forces, has produced the TRAKT (1PN65) and MULAT (1PN86) thermal sight for these ATGM systems. They are fitted without any modifications to the firing post, and the MULAT thermal sight can also be used as an observation and surveillance device. When they are not in use, they are stored in a shockproof protective casings.

#### Technical characteristics for the MULAT (1PN86) thermal sight:

Detection range:		3600 m.
Identification range:		2000 m.
Field of view:	in target identification mode:	1,8" x 3,6"
	in target detection mode:	3,6" x 7,2"
Spectral band:		8-13 m.
Air bottle lifetime:		2,5 h.
Operation time with a single set of SPTA:		7,5 h.
Power consumption:		3,6 W
Weight (with air bottle and battery):		9 kg.
Temperature range:		-40 to +50 °C
Overall dimensions of the unit: (length x width x height)		530 x 204 x 182 mm.

### Remarks

The 9K111 Fagot and 9K111-2 Fagot-M ATGM systems are also manufactured by many other countries from the former Warsaw Pact and mounted on their own vehicles. A good example is Bulgaria which produces these ATGM systems and also mounts them on their own BMP-30 ICV which is based on the chassis of the 2S1 Gvozdika 122 mm. self-propelled artillery system and has a turret from the BMP-2.

